At the core of the Red Sea crisis lies a failure to address the catastrophe in Gaza. But the outright failure of the United Nations’s 2018 Stockholm Agreement in Sweden exacerbated the situation. The Houthis, an Iranian-sponsored terrorist group based in Sanaa, Yemen, were not empowered by the war in Gaza, but by the opportunities granted them by a deal brokered by then-UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths. Houthis spent nearly a decade building an Iranian-supplied arsenal, which permanently threatens global commerce and regional stability.

The failed diplomatic approach in 2018 produced two major consequences: Houthi aggression along the Red Sea and Arabian Sea and the crimes against Yemenis working for humanitarian organizations. Accounts of the battles for Hodeidah city from June to December 2018 depict how anti-Houthi forces were pressured to halt their advance. Humanitarian organizations and analysts warned against “destructive” military operations against Houthis and advocated for a diplomatic approach to prevent dire consequences for the civilian population. By the time Griffiths called for a summit in Stockholm, southern forces and units under Commander Tareq Saleh had reached the airport and advanced to a position within 16 km east of the city.

The summit concluded with a photo-op and handshake between the Legitimate Government’s Foreign Minister, Khaled al-Yamani, and Houthi chief negotiator Muhammad Abd al-Salam. What followed weeks and months later was a classic Houthi manipulation of the Stockholm Agreement — they retained full control over the city, port facilities in Hodeidah and Salif and the oil terminal at Ras Isa. Houthis also neutralized the mechanisms created by the UN Security Council to oversee implementation of the agreement.

Victory postponed

Criticism of the UN approach to conflict in Yemen is not new. Yemenis have attacked every UN Special Envoy since Jamal Benomar (who served from 2011 to 2015), each blamed for further empowering Houthis since they joined the popular uprising against politician and military officer Ali Abdullah Saleh. Benomar was replaced soon after Houthis launched their invasion of the city of Aden in March 2015. Houthis went on to control 25% more territory than they did when Griffiths was appointed as the third UN Envoy to Yemen in 2018. This prompted Griffiths’s replacement.

Reality is far more complicated than a collection of events to justify criticism. However, one can’t ignore failure sustained by insisting on the same approach for a decade expecting different results. Millions of Yemenis have suffered the consequences of war since 2011, and there is still no end in sight for this crisis. Yemenis critical of UN officials are aware Houthi rivals also bear responsibility for a decade of armed conflict, but it is abundantly clear that actions by the UN and others directly empowered Houthis and postponed victories to dislodge the rebels from the cities of Hodeidah, Sanaa and Taiz.

While Saleh’s stepping down in November 2011 was hailed as a major diplomatic achievement, Yemenis highlight the failure of the National Dialogue Conference and the Peace and Partnership Agreement of 2014 as preludes to the catastrophe in December 2018. Houthis learned that the UN, regional powers and the West were unable to counter their manipulation of agreements that merely granted the rebels time to regroup and rearm. The handshake at Stockholm once again served Houthi interests, as it increased operations at Hodeidah’s Red Sea port, allowed troop mobilization east of Saada city and the western al-Jawf province and enabled a strangle-hold over Taiz.

Crimes as consequences

Houthis and their progressive allies in the West present aggression against civilian commercial vessels as operations supporting Palestinians in Gaza. In reality, these attacks have been an extension of Iran’s strategy and Houthi tactics to gain leverage in Yemen.

As members of Iran’s Axis of Resistance, Houthis continue to represent a vital instrument for Iran in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula. While they have independent goals in their fight against Yemeni rivals, they are vital to Iran’s encirclement of Saudi Arabia. Iraqi militias from the north, Houthis from the south and new alliances in East Africa grant Iran indispensable advantages over Gulf monarchies, not just Saudi Arabia.

The attacks along across the Bab al-Mandab strait managed to disrupt the global economy, short of expected damage, but failed to accomplish anything in support of Gaza. The attacks on ships, including the hijacking of the Galaxy Leader and sinking of the Rubymar and M/V Tutor, were not new tactics. Houthis have attacked vessels nearly since the start of the war. Training and weapons facilitated their new capabilities and efficiency employed from October 2023. This shows the international community that as long as they are in power and present along the Red Sea coast, they represent an enduring threat to maritime commerce.

Their strategy, as that of Iran, failed to produce expected results vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the UN. Houthis expected the Coalition to acquiesce on demands for a formal security agreement, and the UN to submit under pressure and increase the flow of aid to northern Yemen. Saudi Arabia remains hesitant to finalize the agreement with Houthis beyond the détente of April 2022, and lack of funds from donors decreased the flow of aid to Houthi controlled territory. In response, Houthis raised the stakes and engaged in so-called “hostage diplomacy;” they launched a criminal campaign last summer that detained dozens of Yemenis who worked for UN agencies and non-governmental organizations.

There is no clear path to a return to peace talks between Houthis and the Legitimate Government. The UN lacks any leverage over Houthis and has simply abandoned Yemeni nationals, which leaves their fate up to willing mediators who in turn have their own demands from the international community. Saudi Arabia faces increasing unpredictability from the US administration, risking further derailment of its 2030 Vision. A major challenge for Houthis this time around is that the structure of the PLC serves to prevent the next Stockholm fiasco. Southern factions within the Legitimate Government will not submit to pressure for a deal that further empowers Houthis once again.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.