Damascus has crossed another significant milestone since the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad collapsed. On March 30, Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani — born Ahmed al-Sharaa and formerly a senior commander of the jihadist group Jabhat al-Nusra — announced the formation of a new cabinet as president of the Syrian Transitional Government (STG).

Initial reactions from analysts and regional observers suggest that al-Jawlani maintains a firm grip over the cabinet. His dominance reflects the continuation of the influence of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which evolved from al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, within the emerging government in post-Assad Damascus. These developments followed fighting earlier in March in Syria’s predominantly Alawite coastal areas. The announcement of an inclusive cabinet may serve more as a public relations move than a substantive shift, especially if HTS forces continue to retaliate against civilians.

The new cabinet, set to govern for up to five years until elections take place, includes 23 ministers. Al-Jawlani included one Christian woman, one Alawite, two Druze and one Kurd. Some ministers, including al-Jawlani himself, studied in Europe. However, only a few lack previous connections to HTS. HTS loyalists occupy four of the most influential posts. These appointments came amid heightened Western pressure on the STG to prove its legitimacy. That pressure increased after a virtual summit hosted by French President Emmanuel Macron called for substantive reforms in Damascus.

Al-Jawlani held the first cabinet meeting on April 7. Days earlier, he named his brother, Maherr al-Sharaa, as head of the General Secretariat of the Presidency. Critics pointed to this decision as an example of nepotism within the HTS-led administration. Many interpreted this move as part of al-Jawlani’s broader effort to consolidate power and solidify his central role in post-Assad Syria.

Beyond the center

Governments in the West and the Middle East remain focused on two concerns. First, they question whether an extremist group like HTS can govern a diverse population. Second, they doubt HTS’s willingness or ability to prevent Syria from becoming a haven for global jihadist networks. Al-Jawlani’s outreach and the presentation of his cabinet may attempt to project competence and inclusivity. However, violence in areas beyond Damascus suggests that stability remains out of reach.

Even before the ink dried on a cooperation agreement between Damascus and Kurdish forces, new clashes erupted in northwestern Syria. Fighting continues in Kurdish-held territories near the Turkish border. Violence in Alawite-dominated coastal towns has briefly subsided. Ethnic tensions challenge the STG’s ability to maintain stability. The administration continues to struggle to secure control over oil resources, which remain vital to economic recovery.

In March, pro-HTS militias and Alawite factions loyal to Assad clashed in Latakia, a coastal province and Assad stronghold. These events raised concerns about Damascus’s limited ability to manage loosely affiliated militant groups. European governments have taken note. Observers warn that the government’s failure to bring all militias under centralized control has enabled widespread abuses. These groups have hindered the Ministry of Interior’s attempts to enforce public order.

Western officials have voiced concern over Syria’s failure to rein in jihadist groups and the crimes committed by Islamist militias against Alawite civilians. Damascus claims that Minister of Defense Marhaf Abu Qasra continues efforts to merge armed factions into formal government forces. However, independent analysts describe it as “almost entirely a symbolic process.” Most factions have refused to integrate or disband, despite HTS’s claims of reform. Only a small fraction of former Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Islamist militias submitted to HTS authority in 2018 and 2019, during conflict in Idlib.

Governing factions

Experts warn that prolonged negotiations with rebel factions and ethnic groups could lead to renewed violence. The STG faces a serious threat from jihadist groups still operating on the fringes of its territory. HTS leaders now face the challenge of asserting control while avoiding confrontation with rival militant groups. Their goal is to prevent widespread chaos from derailing efforts to unify the country under a single authority.

In Aleppo, fighting continues between HTS forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a US-backed coalition led by Kurdish fighters. Elsewhere, HTS confronts Islamic State (IS) elements, some of whom it has controversially absorbed into its own ranks. This arrangement raises concerns that confrontations serve retaliatory purposes rather than genuine security aims. HTS’s strategy to integrate jihadist factions into the Ministry of Interior units, including police and General Security Services, complicates the situation. These units largely come from earlier HTS and Salvation Government formations, at least at the senior leadership level.

HTS’s past affiliation with al-Qaeda and ideological roots in Iraq’s insurgency place it under international scrutiny. US officials have expressed concern over foreign fighters still operating in Syria. They warn that if the STG fails to control them, other groups with no commitment to governance may fill the vacuum. A limited agreement signed on April 1 in Aleppo between al-Jawlani and General Mazlum Abdi, commander of the SDF, laid the groundwork for Kurdish integration into the transitional structure and aimed to prevent interference by extremist groups.

Despite ongoing instability, a well-orchestrated charm campaign continues. European and regional leaders continue to highlight al-Jawlani’s effort to present HTS as a viable governing authority. However, this narrative risks ignoring a critical reality: jihadist factions remain active in key transit zones linking Syria to Europe by land and sea.

The future of Syria depends on actions, not performances. The United States and Europe must maintain pressure on terrorist networks while al-Jawlani works to stabilize the country amid international offers to ease sanctions. The outcome remains uncertain.

[Kaitlyn Diana edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.