For now, the Syrian revolution is certainly Turkey’s victory, but there are obvious ways that they could still squander the advantage.

When Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, ominously suggested on December 11 that an unnamed “neighboring state of Syria” had been instrumental in the downfall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, it was obvious to everyone whom he meant.

The biggest winner in the region right now appears to be Turkey. Remember the Arab Spring? It may feel like a distant memory, but in many ways, its effects have recently resurfaced. What happened in Syria is almost exactly what Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan hoped would unfold in 2011.

He had to wait and endure a great deal of humiliation in the intervening years. His bet on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt went disastrously wrong. Turkey may have supported the wrong side in Libya, which remains an unstable and messy stalemate. And in the Syrian civil war that followed the early democracy protests, Turkey took on the burden of hosting millions of Syrian refugees — more than any other state.

Turkey has long since had to scale back its ambitions in the region. Not only has it made friendly overtures to the Sisi regime in Egypt and to Saudi Arabia — despite the brazen killing in Istanbul of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi by the regime of Mohammed bin Salman — but also to Syria itself.

​​In a final humiliation, Ankara had even begun to accept that it must try to be friendly with Assad once more, despite pushing so hard to remove him. The pressure to support Assad again came from the need to send back Syrian refugees, whose presence had caused electoral issues in Turkey.

Turkey’s victory

Turkey can, with some vindication, claim a great deal of credit for events in Syria. It was the deal they struck with Russia that allowed Idlib — the last desperate rump of rebel territory in Syria — to remain unconquered. It is clear that without Turkey, whose troops have been stationed in Idlib since 2017 as a “de-escalation” force, Assad and the Russians might well have finished off the rebellion years ago.

It is unclear to what extent the Russian leadership decided to keep Assad slightly off-balance for strategic reasons. This policy made Assad more dependent on Russia by deliberately ceding Syrian territory that remained beyond Assad’s control.

If Russia did try to fool Assad, it backfired. However, as with everything in the Syrian conflict, it is not as simple as “Turkey takes all.” In fact, Turkish influence over Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) — the rebel group that led the lightning raid on Aleppo and turned into a stampede toward Damascus — is limited.

Turkish-backed rebels have established a presence in two pockets of territory north of Aleppo. While these groups have played a significant role in the Syrian conflict, their primary focus has been on combating the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led militia that received US support and helped expel the Salafist self-declared caliphate Islamic State from northern Syria in 2019.

This situation may be a dream come true for President Erdoğan, but it could also fail to go Turkey’s way. Turkey is a major obstacle to the ambitions of international actors who want a new Syrian government that is genuinely inclusive of all Syrians.

Turkey’s Kurdish problem

A major ethnic group in Syria is the significant Kurdish minority, concentrated along the northern border region next to Turkey and Iraq. Their political leadership is dominated by parties associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been in conflict with the Turkish state since the 1980s.

The People’s Protection Units (YPG) is a Kurdish militia that forms the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and controls al-Hasaka, a triangle of land sandwiched between Turkey and Iraq in the far northeast. They also control a strip of the northern border with Turkey, including the border town of Kobani, which was made infamous after the Kurds, backed by the US, led a successful assault to recapture it from the Islamic State.

While not actively supporting the Islamic State, Turkey appeared to favor it over Kurdish militias in the region. Turkey routinely describes these groups as ‘terrorists’ due to their connection with the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist group by many international organizations.

Many believed that Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), with its roots in political Islam, was more comfortable with Islamist jihadists than with either the Kurdish groups in Syria or the Alawite regime of the Assad family.

This preference is also evident in the aftermath of the war now that HTS — with roots in al-Qaeda — has led the siege of Aleppo. Many suspect HTS received some support from Ankara. Clearly, a successful outcome for Turkey would be a new Syrian government dominated by Sunni Muslims who subscribe to a mild form of Islamism. Ideally, Turkey would maintain good relations with outside actors while appealing to the new Syrian government to impose its rule over the Kurds in northern Syria. It would also be ideal for Turkey if the leaders of Syria suppressed the SDF, which is currently the de facto authority in much of the north.

Trouble ahead for Syria

Turkey’s vision for Syria is unrealistic and is likely to result in a future where many parties are excluded from the table. If Ankara promotes and encourages actors in Syria who aim to suppress Kurdish power and representation, it risks undermining the country’s quest for democracy. This could lead to a new regime that represses non-Arabs in the same way the Assad regime did. The Syrian Arab Republic held ethnic exclusivity as a fundamental aspect of its society. This type of exclusion is also the root of Turkey’s intractable issue with its Kurdish minority.

Until the states of the Middle East can begin to move beyond narrow ethnic nationalism and recognize the multi-ethnic nature of their polities, we are likely to see continued repression and instability. In this grim future, each state will feed off the weaknesses of its neighbors to gain influence and leverage in their affairs.

[Joey T. McFadden edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.