No institution lasts forever, and NATO is no exception. If the “transatlantic bargain” no longer makes sense for any of the partners, they will split. But chances are that this transatlantic divorce will be postponed once again, as it has been postponed for decades. Why? Because the juggling with numbers and a generous helping of game theory, as exemplified by Alexander Coward’s piece, “It’s Time for the US To Bid Farewell to NATO,” does not express what is really at stake: that the Allies are better off together than apart.

Yes, Europe’s population is bigger than that of the United States. Yes, Europe’s economic power is roughly on par with the US. Yes, Europeans have been living quite comfortably with the US paying for a large part of the common defense burden. However, the conclusion from this is not for the US to exit NATO, but to reform the Alliance in order to better reflect the imperative of a fairer sharing of the defense burden. If President-elect Donald Trump is now boasting that he has made the Allies increase their defense budgets, he is right: The US’s allies can step up to the plate, even if to some observers that process may look unnervingly slow.

Clearly, NATO cannot thrive on Cold War nostalgia. But those who adhere to the caricature of the alliance as a mere burden-shedding exercise for wily Europeans risk missing the forest for the trees. Unsurprisingly, as a superpower with global security interests and commitments, the US considerably outspends its NATO allies. But it gets more in return than meets the eye. Here are five primary benefits NATO provides the US.

European stability and US influence

First, NATO upholds stability in Europe. Ensuring that a conflict in Europe does not lead once again to global war has been a major goal of US foreign policy since 1945. NATO has served this goal well: It prevented the Cold War from getting hot and, at the Cold War’s end, provided a security home for the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO also played an indispensable role in bringing peace to the Balkans after the violent collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.

Today, with Russia waging a major war against Ukraine using political support from China, soldiers from North Korea and drones from Iran, the US would shoot itself in the foot by disengaging. Europeans understand that the Asia-Pacific region is gaining in importance. However, this does not require kissing NATO goodbye, but to have Europe take a greater share of the dense burden on their own continent. This is exactly what is happening, with most allies agreeing that NATO’s initial goal of spending 2% of GDP on defense is no longer the ceiling, but only the floor.

Second, the current arrangement gives the US influence over European security developments. The US and Europe form the world’s largest trade and investment relationship. Considering that in addition to the US’s security interests, its need to maintain influence on European issues should be a no-brainer.

NATO is the major institutional framework that legitimizes such a role for the US. Through the organization, the US has effectively become a “European power,” with a unique voice in European affairs well beyond defense. Without US membership in NATO, a major political and military “transmission belt” would be lost, and US weight in Europe would be much reduced. Washington knows that, even if academic observers often don’t.

NATO contains Russia, and its members are reliable allies

Third, NATO helps contain Russia. Russia’s current military assertiveness demonstrates that geopolitics did not end with the Cold War. Ukraine was outside the defense perimeter of NATO and the US, so Moscow concluded that attacking that country would carry little risk. However, Moscow knows that attacking countries within NATO would be an entirely different ballgame.

In terms of sheer numbers, Europe can match Russia in many categories of military equipment as well as in manpower. However, it is the US military and political leadership that makes the crucial difference. This is why Moscow has always sought to push the US out of Europe, and why it is now seeking to keep its war against Ukraine a regional affair, thus avoiding any direct involvement of NATO.

Today, a credible deterrence posture comes with a smaller price tag than the massive military presence that the US maintained in Europe during the Cold War. But a complete bailing out of European security would lead the US’s challengers to conclude that Washington no longer has the guts to uphold the liberal order. As a result, Washington’s red lines would be tested around the world. If the US wants to remain a global power, it will have to remain a “European power” as well.

Fourth, the countries within NATO are reliable US allies. As former UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed during World War II, “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that is fighting without them.” Given the multitude of security challenges, this sentiment still rings true. NATO provides the US with allies that are more militarily capable, more interoperable and more willing to share risks and burdens. In Afghanistan, for example, even though some NATO allies suffered major casualties, none of them quit. Achieving consensus in NATO can be tedious at times, but once allies agree on a certain course of action, they carry it through.

True, coalitions of the willing may be easier to put together. But they also tend to dissolve much more easily, and the US has to provide an even higher percentage of troops and equipment than to NATO-led operations. Whether fighting in Afghanistan, Libya or countering the so-called Islamic State — when the challenge requires a sustained, long-term effort, using NATO, or at least its tried-and-tested procedures, is still the best option.

Moreover, in NATO, Washington finds 31 allies around the same table. They are predisposed to working with the US. Everywhere else in the world, Washington has to work through complicated bilateral relationships without getting as much in return.

Political and military predictability

Fifth, NATO offers political and military predictability. After centuries of war, the organization represented a new way of organizing security. Rather than relying on rapidly changing coalitions of the willing or bilateral security agreements, North America and Europe would enter into a permanent alliance, supported by political consultation and military planning mechanisms. This unique arrangement creates a degree of political predictability and military interoperability that other parts of the world look jealously upon.

By contrast, to argue that an “unpredictable” post-NATO US would be a boon to security and would enhance deterrence appears like pure satire, courtesy of the academic ivory tower. Russia has been unpredictable for some time now, but did this improve its geopolitical position? Did its unpredictability deter the West from supplying Ukraine with weapons and money?

International politics in the nuclear age is not a poker game. If the US left NATO, deterrence would be weakened, not strengthened. Washington may believe that unpredictability is a virtue, yet China, Russia and all those who seek to build a new international order on their own terms would simply read it as: “I no longer care.”

For all these reasons, reducing NATO to the issue of fair or unfair burden-sharing has it wrong. The US defense budget reflects the military expenditures of a global power. It therefore goes well beyond NATO, which at the highest estimate represents no more than 15% of total US defense spending. A withdrawal from NATO would translate to relatively small savings for the US. However, Washington would lose allies, military bases and the political predictability established through daily multilateral consultations in the NATO framework.

In short, NATO is about much more than money: It is a long-term strategic alliance, which provides tremendous strategic value for the US, Europe and indeed the West at large.

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.