Given the drama taking place in the past two days, I decided to launch an experiment that can play out over several weeks or months. I asked ChatGPT about the background on the events that have toppled the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

It turns out to be a very efficient way of gleaning information, compared to comparing accounts in commercial media. I’m looking to follow this up in the coming weeks as well explore the question of how an AI chatbot can “think about” breaking news and craft its “understanding” of the events. I began with a simple prompt: “Tell me everything I need to know about Abu Mohammed al-Julani.”

The chatbot offered this response:

“Abu Mohammed al-Julani is a prominent and controversial figure in the Syrian conflict, best known as the leader of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a powerful jihadist group in northwest Syria. Here’s an in-depth overview:

1. Background and Early Life

• Real Name: His real name is believed to be Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a (or al-Sharaa).
• Nationality: Syrian. Born in 1982 in the Golan Heights, which Israel captured in 1967.
• Education: Little is publicly known about his early education, but he reportedly studied in Damascus and spent time in Iraq during the U.S.-led invasion.

2. Role in Jihadist Movements

• Iraq War: Al-Julani emerged as a jihadist during the U.S. invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s. He allegedly joined al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), then led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
• During this time, he developed strong connections with jihadist networks, gaining experience as both a fighter and a strategist.

3. Founding of Jabhat al-Nusra

• 2011-2012: With the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War, al-Julani returned to Syria and established Jabhat al-Nusra (‘The Support Front’) as an offshoot of al-Qaeda.
• Goals: Initially, Jabhat al-Nusra focused on fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Its tactics—suicide bombings, coordinated attacks—quickly gained notoriety.
• Al-Qaeda Ties: Julani pledged allegiance to Ayman al-Zawahiri, then leader of al-Qaeda, officially aligning Nusra with the global jihadist group.

4. Rift with ISIS

• 2013: A major split occurred when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria), claimed that Jabhat al-Nusra was part of ISIS. Al-Julani refused to merge under Baghdadi’s leadership.
• Tensions: Julani reaffirmed loyalty to al-Qaeda, leading to a violent rivalry between Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS. This schism shaped the Syrian jihadist landscape, as the two groups competed for fighters, resources, and dominance.

5. Rebranding and Transformation

Al-Julani has shown a remarkable ability to adapt his image and strategy:

• 2016: Jabhat al-Nusra rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (JFS), claiming to have severed ties with al-Qaeda to appeal to Syrian rebels and local populations.
• 2017: JFS evolved into Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a coalition of jihadist factions. While HTS claimed independence from al-Qaeda, many analysts believe its leadership and ideology remained aligned with the group’s core jihadist principles.

6. Leadership of HTS

Under al-Julani’s leadership, HTS emerged as the dominant force in Syria’s northwest, particularly in Idlib Province:

• Control of Idlib: HTS exercises de facto governance over Idlib, imposing its interpretation of Islamic law while managing civil administration and local services.
• Relations with Turkey: Al-Julani has pursued pragmatic ties with Turkey, which exerts influence in northern Syria, despite Turkey’s historical opposition to jihadist groups.
• Shift in Rhetoric: In recent years, al-Julani has positioned HTS as a ‘Syrian nationalist’ movement focused on defeating Assad, distancing himself from transnational jihadist ambitions.

7. Western Perception and Sanctions

• Terrorist Designation: The U.S. designated al-Julani and HTS as terrorists, citing their jihadist origins and extremist tactics.
• $10 Million Bounty: The U.S. State Department offered a $10 million reward for information leading to al-Julani’s capture.
• Media Appearances: Al-Julani has attempted to rebrand himself as a legitimate opposition leader, even granting interviews (e.g., to PBS Frontline in 2021), where he wore a suit instead of jihadist attire to appeal to Western audiences.

8. Ideological Stance and Strategy

• Shifts in Focus: Al-Julani’s leadership shows a tactical shift from global jihadism to localized insurgency. This pragmatism includes:
  • Collaborating with non-jihadist factions against the Assad regime.
  • Balancing extremist ideology with efforts to govern Idlib effectively.
• Criticism: Hardline jihadists accuse him of abandoning al-Qaeda’s ideology, while others see his pragmatism as a survival strategy.

9. Current Status

• As of 2024, Abu Mohammed al-Julani remains in control of HTS and Idlib Province.
• Challenges:
  • Ongoing pressure from Assad’s forces and Russian airstrikes.
  • Internal dissent from rival jihadist factions.
  • The delicate balancing act of maintaining relations with Turkey while evading direct Western intervention.

Conclusion

Abu Mohammed al-Julani is a complex figure whose trajectory reflects the evolution of the Syrian jihadist movement. He has shifted from a staunch al-Qaeda loyalist to a pragmatic insurgent leader focused on local governance. His ability to rebrand HTS, adapt to political realities, and consolidate power in Idlib highlights his strategic acumen, even as he remains a deeply polarizing figure in the Syrian conflict.”

I followed this useful information up with a second question, which I propose to continue to explore in future columns.

“What do we know about the support his movement has received from Türkiye and possibly NATO as well as any other sources of Western support? Given that he has had the kind of support that has enabled his movement to topple the Assad regime, how is he likely to mobilize the force his allies represent to craft a new system of government of Syria?”

ChatGPT offered a detailed response, but I’ll simply reproduce just the conclusion.

“Conclusion

Abu Mohammed al-Julani’s HTS has received indirect support from Türkiye and tacit Western tolerance, enabling it to consolidate control in Idlib. However, its ability to topple the Assad regime remains constrained by military, geopolitical, and ideological challenges. If al-Julani can continue his pragmatic rebranding and align HTS with external actors’ interests—particularly Türkiye’s—he may position himself as a key player in shaping a new Syrian governance framework, albeit under a localized Islamist model rather than a transnational jihadist agenda.”

I then followed up with a new question:

“What position has the US taken on his challenge to the Assad regime and has that engendered any assistance or even complicity in his success? Have there been any official statements about what role the US could play in the new Syrian regime?”

In the interest of relative brevity, here are the key elements of ChatGPT’s response. 

“The United States’ position on Abu Mohammed al-Julani and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is complex, characterized by a combination of outright opposition, quiet pragmatism, and geopolitical calculation. While the U.S. has firmly designated al-Julani and HTS as terrorists, the evolving situation in Syria and HTS’s local dominance have led to a more nuanced approach.

1. Official U.S. Position on HTS and Al-Julani

• Terrorist Designation
• Reward for Al-Julani: The U.S. State Department placed a $10 million bounty on al-Julani under its ‘Rewards for Justice’ program. This remains in effect.

2. U.S. Policy Toward Assad and Indirect Dynamics with HTS

The U.S. has long maintained a position that Bashar al-Assad should not remain in power, but regime change has not been an active policy since at least 2015. This nuanced position creates an implicit dynamic in which HTS’s challenge to Assad aligns with U.S. interests in some ways, even if HTS itself remains a U.S.-designated enemy:

3. Allegations of Indirect U.S. Complicity

Some analysts and regional observers have suggested that the U.S.’s focus on ISIS and its reluctance to directly target HTS have enabled al-Julani’s success in northwest Syria:

• Shift in U.S. Priorities: Since 2014, the U.S. military intervention in Syria has centered on combating ISIS. This has created a de facto prioritization of ISIS over other jihadist factions like HTS.
• Unspoken Pragmatism: HTS’s crackdown on ISIS and its efforts to position itself as a more moderate insurgent group may have led to quiet U.S. tolerance, even as it continues to label HTS as a terrorist group.
• Humanitarian Aid Dilemma: U.S.-backed humanitarian aid to Idlib is often distributed through local governance structures that HTS dominates. While aid is intended for civilians, it inevitably strengthens HTS’s administrative control.

4. U.S. Engagement with Al-Julani and HTS

While the U.S. has not formally engaged with al-Julani, there are notable developments signaling a possible shift in Western perceptions:

• Al-Julani’s Media Outreach: In 2021, al-Julani gave an interview to PBS’s Frontline, in which he downplayed HTS’s jihadist roots and presented his group as a localized Syrian movement fighting Assad.
• Expert Opinions: Some Western analysts and policymakers have argued that engaging with HTS—despite its history—may be necessary to stabilize Idlib and contain Assad, Iran, and Russia. These discussions remain unofficial and have not translated into a change in U.S. policy.

5. U.S. Statements on Syria’s Future Government

The U.S. has not made any official statements regarding a potential role for HTS or al-Julani in Syria’s future government.

6. Role of the U.S. in Syria’s Post-Conflict Governance

• Diplomatic Limitations: The U.S. does not have the leverage or interest to play a central role in shaping Syria’s governance.
• HTS and the U.S. Exclusion: The U.S. would likely oppose any formal inclusion of HTS in a future Syrian government due to its terrorism designation. For HTS to be considered a legitimate political actor, al-Julani would need to:
  • Fully sever ties with al-Qaeda and other extremist networks.
  • Accept a political process under international mediation.
  • Demonstrate meaningful moderation of HTS’s ideology and actions.

Conclusion

The U.S. position on Abu Mohammed al-Julani and HTS remains ambivalent: while it designates HTS as a terrorist organization and opposes al-Julani’s leadership, U.S. policies—such as targeting ISIS and avoiding direct conflict with HTS—have indirectly contributed to HTS’s ability to consolidate power in Idlib.”

ChatGPT’s responses point to a number of issues that need to be explored further. We will follow this up in further columns by asking similar questions and further probing questions.

I invite readers who wish to join in this interrogation of contemporary history to submit their own remarks, insights or questions, which we will integrate into the experiment. This is an opportunity to participate in a “crucible of collaboration” on a story that already has global significance and is likely to affect all of our futures, directly or indirectly. It has multiple dimensions, which we can explore together, accompanied by our AI friends.

Your thoughts

Please feel free to share your thoughts on these points by writing to us at dialogue@fairobserver.com. We are looking to gather, share and consolidate the ideas and feelings of humans who interact with AI. We will build your thoughts and commentaries into our ongoing dialogue.

*[Artificial Intelligence is rapidly becoming a feature of everyone’s daily life. We unconsciously perceive it either as a friend or foe, a helper or destroyer. At Fair Observer, we see it as a tool of creativity, capable of revealing the complex relationship between humans and machines.]

[Lee Thompson-Kolar edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.