Russia illegally and deliberately interfered in the recent Moldovan presidential elections. It may even be laying the groundwork for a false flag operation in Moldova’s Transnistria region, providing a pretext for invading the nation. Russia is evidently willing to destabilize its neighbors in order to expand its sphere of influence.

Moscow could easily adapt this broader strategy to the Western Balkans, particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina remains one of the most politically volatile states in the region. It has a legacy of ethno-political divisions. The Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the Bosnian War in 1995 is fragile.

A potential flashpoint lies in Republika Srpska, the Serb-majority entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, where secessionist ambitions are a persistent undercurrent in political discourse. A well-executed false flag operation by Russia could serve as a pretext to destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina and pave the way for Republika Srpska to declare independence, transforming it into a satellite akin to Abkhazia or South Ossetia in Georgia.

Russia’s strategic interests in the Balkans revolve around undermining Euro-Atlantic integration, in addition to maintaining influence in a region historically linked to Slavic and Orthodox cultures. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s aspirations for NATO and EU membership are particularly problematic for Moscow, which views such moves as an encroachment on its sphere of influence — it is already furious at the extent of NATO expansion in the Balkans today, which has left only Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Kosovo outside the alliance. 

Republika Srpska is a highly autonomous political entity comprising 49% of the country and covering its eastern and northern borders. Under the de facto 16-year leadership of Milorad Dodik, it has frequently flirted with the idea of secession, capitalizing on the entity’s significant autonomy within Bosnia and Herzegovina to resist centralization efforts and align closely with Belgrade’s and Moscow’s interests. 

Furthermore, Dodik’s criminal links and business ties with Serbia’s strongman Aleksandar Vučić and fellow pro-Russian aligned Serb politicians and underground networks in Montenegro and Kosovo are well known and well documented. Dodik himself takes pride in having met Russian President Vladimir Putin more than a dozen times and has continuously defied the authority of Christian Schmidt, the appointed High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, who is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. 

Deception in the Balkans

A highly concerning potential scenario is emerging. Russia could carry out a false flag operation, creating the illusion of a crisis that necessitates Republika Srpska‘s unilateral declaration of independence, all while providing Russia with plausible deniability.

The target for such a false flag operation could be a symbolically significant site or community within Republika Srpska. This could include ethnically mixed areas and towns like Brčko, where ethnic Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks coexist, or it could take the form of an attack (framed as terrorism) on critical infrastructure sites such as bridges, transportation hubs or government. Moreover, targeting critical economic infrastructure, such as energy pipelines or trade routes and blaming Bosniak Muslim or Croat elements could portray the Republika Srpska as an economically besieged entity. Russia could then step in with economic aid and recognition, mirroring its actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

Radical nationalist groups or extremist organizations with ties to Belgrade or other external forces could target emotionally sensitive locations such as Srebrenica, site of the 1995 genocide perpetrated by Bosnian Serbs against Bosniak Muslims, with a false-flag operation.

These groups could carry out an attack on Muslim returnees in that town or launch an arsonist attack against a local mosque, which would be enough to provoke Bosniak Muslims to launch reciprocal attacks against Serbs in Muslim-majority areas. That would spark tit-for-tat violence which would quickly spiral out of control in a country where almost every household has an assault rifle buried in its backyard. 

Another possible false flag operation would involve covert Russian operatives or local proxies staging an attack and attributing it to Bosniak Muslim extremists. This narrative could exploit existing Islamophobic hatred among Bosnian Serbs towards Bosniak Muslims, portraying the Serb entity as under siege and its independence as a necessary step to protect its people. 

Russia’s extensive disinformation apparatus would likely amplify this false narrative. Pro-Russian media outlets active in the Balkans — such as RT and Sputnik — as well as social media bots and influencers would disseminate fabricated evidence of Bosniak aggression or Western complicity. Concurrently, Russian officials could use diplomatic channels to cast doubt on the credibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutions and NATO’s intentions.

A perfect storm of manipulation 

In the aftermath of a staged attack, Republika Srpska authorities would declare a state of emergency, mobilize its security forces, set up hard borders along the existing invisible entity-division line and declare independence. Russia, leveraging its position in the UN Security Council, could block any resolutions condemning the Republika Srpska while extending “humanitarian” support to the entity. Given Russia’s heavy presence in neighboring Serbia — especially its so-called humanitarian center in Niš (seen by the US as a spy center) this would be relatively easy to carry out bearing in mind that Republika Srpska effectively shares a 302-kilometer-long border with Serbia.

For such a plan to succeed, several preconditions must align. First and foremost, weak state institutions and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fragmented governance structure, characterized by competing ethnic agendas and an under-resourced central government, provide fertile ground for manipulation.

Secondly, there is plenty of distrust among Bosnian Serbs towards the international community, particularly towards NATO, foreign embassies in Sarajevo and the Office of the High Representative. Russia could exploit this distrust to fuel grievances among Republika Srpska leaders, potentially destabilizing the region.

Thirdly, there must be local proxies — “little green men” like we saw in Crimea — and there are plenty. In the Republika Srpska there are already well-connected pro-Russian biker gangs, local chapters of the Night Wolves, criminal networks and paramilitary units often tied to veterans’ associations. These could serve as enforcers in the wake of a false flag operation.

Finally, there must be global distractions: a concurrent global crisis, such as heightened tensions in Ukraine or the Middle East, could divert Western attention and resources away from the Balkans.

All this is in place at the moment.

Who would respond?

The international response to a false flag operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be crucial in determining its success. However, the West faces several challenges. 

At the very outset, the international community’s focus is divided. With NATO and the EU preoccupied with Ukraine, anxiety over US President Donald Trump’s new administration and Europe’s own defense shortcomings, their ability to respond decisively to Balkan instability may be limited. For example, the international community failed to react and refuses to openly hold Belgrade accountable for the Banjska Monastery incident, a thwarted but very serious attempt by criminals affiliated with Belgrade to destabilize Kosovo, despite overwhelming evidence.

Furthermore, the international community promotes inconsistent policies. Western powers have often struggled to present a unified stance on Bosnia and Herzegovina, with some EU nations such as France and Germany prioritizing stability over justice and reform. Meanwhile, US President Joe Biden’s policy of “decoupling” Serbia from Russia, and thereby the Republika Srpska too, was a failure of epic proportions. 

Serbia has not only played these actors but used the legitimacy it gained from the US and EU to tighten its repression against any forms of opposition to the Vučić regime. All the while, it continues to receive EU investment and to maintain cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing.

Should the Republika Srpska declare independence, who would react? Bosnia and Herzegovina’s armed forces cannot react without a unified decision of all three members of the tripartite presidency, and the Serb member of the presidency will never vote to send the country’s forces against his or her own statelet. Given that Darko Ćulum, former interior Minister of the Republika Srpska, runs the State Security Agency (SIPA), it is unlikely that he will send special forces to prevent the entity from declaring independence either.

From my observations as a journalist working in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the past twenty years, all Republika Srpska politicians, regardless of their political party affiliations, pledge their allegiance first and foremost to the Republika Srpska and not to Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many of them have even made public statements expressing their disrespect and even outright hatred for the country.

Defusing a Balkan powder keg

EUFOR, the European Union’s peacekeeping mission, is unlikely to react effectively to a crisis. It has only around 600 soldiers, mostly reservists without heavy weaponry or military experience.

Similarly, NATO’s headquartes in Sarajevo has a limited mandate, focusing on providing assistance and advice to the country’s military reform process rather than taking direct action.In other words, NATO would have to deploy a rapid reaction force if it decided to act. A number of high-ranking NATO generals are certainly following events in Bosnia and Herzegovina closely. They would push for a quick response. But would all 32 NATO members vote to send forces to keep the peace in a small slice of non-NATO territory? 

For me, the answer is in the affirmative. This isn’t because there is any love between NATO and non-member Bosnia and Herzegovina, but because the last thing NATO needs is another Abkhazia, this time nested between two NATO member states (Croatia and Montenegro).

Before things get out of control, it is imperative to prioritize certain measures. First and foremost, EUFOR’s presence must be beefed up to a brigade level. A more visible EUFOR presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including joint military exercises, public military presence and counter-disinformation campaigns, could deter Russian adventurism.

Another avenue is bilateral military cooperation. For one thing, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s armed forces have had decades-long military cooperation with the Maryland National Guard. The US can intensify this existing cooperation, which would send a very strong message to Moscow. 

Moreover, the NATO headquarters in Sarajevo must increase its public visibility and take concrete steps to promote the political, economic and social merits of joining the alliance. Merely organizing closed-door roundtable discussions and meetings about the need to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina’s military has proven futile. It needs to embed cyber security and disinformation advisors to work in key ministries and agencies and provide support. 

Enhanced support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central government, judiciary and security apparatus could mitigate vulnerabilities. These institutions must be reformed in order to prevent them from being hijacked or blocked by Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat nationalists. Bosnia and Herzegovina risks a Lebanon-like scenario if left to the mercy of vetoes by ethnically driven agendas.A Russian-backed false flag operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is a plausible scenario, and Republika Srpska’s secession would not only destabilize Bosnia and Herzegovina but also set a dangerous precedent for other frozen conflicts in Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina neighbors two NATO member states — Croatia and Montenegro — and any conflict in the country would have a spill-over effect that would drag the transatlantic alliance in. Ultimately, to prevent this outcome, the international community must remain vigilant, proactive and united in supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Only through robust preventive measures can the region avoid becoming the next theater of Russian geopolitical gamesmanship.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.