For over two decades, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime maintained power through an iron grip on the state’s institutions. Yet, this period also saw the systematic destruction of Syria’s social fabric. The devastating civil war that erupted in 2011, fueled by the Arab Spring uprisings, decimated the Syrian economy and forced millions of its citizens to flee their homes.

The Assad regime recently collapsed after opposition groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Syrian National Forces (SNF), backed by Turkey, launched a military push. At the same time, Russia and Iran reduced this support for Assad. This shift offers a glimmer of hope for a nation scarred by war and oppression. 

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria has effectively come under the de facto influence of Turkey and Israel. The October 7 events, when Hamas launched a large-scale attack on Israel, further weakened Iran’s axis of resistance and its strategic project aimed at undermining Israel, delivering a significant blow to Iran. The attack triggered a full-scale war, leading to devastating Israeli retaliatory strikes on Gaza and escalating regional tensions.

Additionally, Russia anchored its foothold in the Middle East through a close alliance with the Assad regime and a naval base in Latakia, which gave it access to the Mediterranean. This allowed Russia to project power in the region and counter Western influence directly. The loss of this strategic leverage has diminished Russia’s ability to maintain a strong presence and shape events in the Middle East. 

Turkey and Israel stand to benefit from this new dynamic. They will use their influence to combat terrorist organizations within Syrian borders.

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham: savior or threat?

Bashar al-Assad’s father, Hafez al-Assad, established the Assad regime in 1971 and entrenched a model of authoritarian rule centered on the Baʿath Party and the military security apparatus. Hafez consolidated power through ruthless suppression. He favored sectarian divisions and had an extensive patronage network. Bashar al-Assad succeeded his father in 2000. He initially offered hope for reform but quickly reverted to autocracy. The authorities brutally cracked down on the 2011 Arab Spring protests. The war plunged Syria into a devastating civil war. Assad’s regime, backed by Iran, Hezbollah and Russia, clung to power through scorched-earth tactics. They massively used chemical weapons and a campaign of mass terror.

At the forefront of the opposition is HTS. It traces back to al-Nusra Front, an al-Qaeda affiliate that emerged in 2012 during the early years of the Syrian conflict. Initially committed to global jihad, the group rebranded itself as HTS in 2017 under the leadership of Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. It declared a break from al-Qaeda and positioned itself as a nationalist force focused on Syria’s liberation.

Over the years, HTS has transitioned from a shadowy jihadist group to the dominant force in Syria’s northwest. It achieved a level of military and administrative control unmatched by other opposition factions. Its leadership claims a commitment to inclusive governance and minority rights, but its history of draconian social policies and sectarian leanings undermines these assertions.

Despite its pivotal role in Assad’s ouster, HTS faces challenges in gaining legitimacy. Turkey, the United States and other international actors still designate it as a terrorist organization. This limits HTS’s ability to secure external support. Allegations of corruption, intimidation and arbitrary detention have marred its governance in areas under its control. Moreover, its Islamist orientation raises alarms about the safety of Syria’s minority communities, particularly Alawites and Christians.

The fall of Assad is a blow to Iran and Russia’s regional ambitions

Iran’s intervention in Syria’s civil war after the Arab Spring was critical in sustaining the Assad regime. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), was instrumental in Iran’s involvement. Soleimani coordinated a network of militias, including Hezbollah from Lebanon and other Shiite paramilitary groups from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, to bolster Assad’s forces. His maneuvers in battles, such as the recapture of Aleppo in 2016, not only saved Assad’s government but also cemented Iran’s influence in Syria.

Iran invested billions of dollars in Syria, financing military operations and rebuilding infrastructure in areas under Assad’s control. This financial and material backing was coupled with an extensive military presence, including IRGC forces, advisors and bases across Syria. Syria became a conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah, enabling Tehran to transfer advanced weaponry, including missiles and drones, to its Lebanese proxy. Establishing weapons factories and logistical hubs in Syrian territory allowed Iran to bypass international sanctions and enhance Hezbollah’s military capabilities.

The fall of Assad’s regime dismantled the axis of resistance that Tehran painstakingly built. Following the October 7 escalation and the broader war with Israel, Hamas suffered devastating losses, and its leadership, including Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, was eliminated. Hezbollah, already stretched thin from years of engagement in Syria, faced intensified Israeli retaliation that crippled its command structure. During this period, Israel killed Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, dealing a symbolic and operational blow to the group.

Moqtada-al Sadr, a Shiite cleric and leader of the Sadrist Movement in Iraq, refused to stand by Assad during his downfall, underscoring Tehran’s waning influence, even among its Shiite allies. Among Iran’s loyal partners, only the Houthi movement in Yemen remains severely curtailing Iran’s ability to project power in the region.

Now, Iran faces the prospect of direct confrontation with Israel, which has set its sights on Tehran’s nuclear infrastructure. The fall of Assad underscores Iran’s growing vulnerability. Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, may confront the possibility that it could be the next target in a reshaped Middle East dominated by Israeli and Turkish influence.

Russia’s intervention in Syria, beginning in 2015, was a game-changer for the Assad regime. Vladimir Putin aimed to stabilize Assad’s rule and preserve Moscow’s influence in the Middle East by deploying airpower and special forces. Russian military support, including the bombing campaigns in Aleppo and Idlib, turned the tide of the war in Assad’s favor. Putin also leveraged diplomatic efforts, such as the Astana peace talks, to secure Russia’s position as a key power broker in the conflict.

Syria was more than an ally for Russia — it was a strategic asset. The naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Hmeimim allowed Moscow to project power into the Mediterranean to counterbalance NATO’s presence.

Syria represented a symbolic victory for Putin’s broader geopolitical strategy. It demonstrated Russia’s resurgence as a global power capable of challenging the West, especially after the annexation of Crimea and tensions in Ukraine.

The collapse of Assad’s regime undermines Russia’s ambitions in the region. The loss of its military bases jeopardizes Moscow’s ability to counterbalance NATO and maintain a foothold in the Mediterranean.

Alexander Dugin, known as Putin’s “brain,” has remarked that the fall of Assad symbolizes a collapse of Moscow’s ability to shape outcomes in the Middle East. This failure, he argues, is a profound setback for Putin’s vision of a multipolar world where Russia stands as a counterweight to Western dominance.

Moreover, the downfall of the Assad regime questions Russia’s reliability as an ally. It parallels the US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s subsequent rise to power. Just as the chaotic exit from Kabul signaled a blow to American credibility, Assad’s fall marks a significant setback for Russia’s regional strategy. For Putin, the challenge now is twofold: to salvage Russia’s position in the Middle East and to manage the domestic fallout from another costly foreign venture that failed.

Turkey and Israel as Syria’s de facto decision-makers

Before Bashar al-Assad came to power, Israel’s relationship with Syria was full of hostility and conflict. Syria, under Hafez al-Assad, supported Hezbollah in Lebanon and harbored Palestinian militant organizations. Israel captured the Golan Heights during the Six-Day War in 1967, and it has remained a focal point of tension. Syria demands its return, while Israel prioritizes its strategic importance for security.

The 1990s saw limited attempts at peace negotiations, including the 1991 Madrid Conference and subsequent talks mediated by the US. However, these efforts failed to yield a breakthrough due to mutual distrust and irreconcilable differences over the Golan Heights.

When Bashar al-Assad assumed power, hopes for reform and improved relations with Israel were quickly dashed. Assad’s regime deepened its alliance with Iran. He continued providing support to Hezbollah. Then, the Syrian Civil War entrenched hostility as Assad’s government accused Israel of backing rebel factions.

Israel primarily focused its involvement in the Syrian conflict on countering Iranian influence and preventing the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) targeted Iranian bases, arms depots, and convoys. IDF has admitted to hundreds of strikes targeting Iranian and Hezbollah positions to prevent arms transfers and deter threats near its borders. 

With the fall of the Asad regime, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has hailed it as a pivotal moment in Middle Eastern geopolitics. It marks a continuation of Israel’s strategic policies aimed at dismantling terrorist organizations and curbing Iran’s influence in the region. Netanyahu’s celebration is not merely symbolic; it underscores Israel’s proactive stance in shaping the Middle East. Israel sends a clear message that it will not tolerate any actor that threatens its sovereignty or regional stability.

Netanyahu explicitly warned the new leaders of Syria that they must not emulate Assad’s policies, cautioning that they would face the same fate if they did. Israel’s post-Assad policies should include:

• Preventing the Iranian regime’s entrenchment.
• Securing the Golan Heights to prevent cross-border attacks.
• Collaborating with international partners, especially Turkey, to support a political solution that prioritizes regional security and limits the resurgence of extremist factions.

Turkey has experienced shifting dynamics in its relationship with the Assad regime. Initially, Ankara and Damascus shared a pragmatic relationship during the late 1990s and early 2000s, as both countries sought to resolve border disputes and enhance economic ties. The Adana Agreement of 1998, which led to Syria expelling the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) — designated as a terrorist organization by the US, EU, Turkey and Israel — leader Abdullah Öcalan exemplified this period of cooperation. However, the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War in 2011 caused a significant rift. President Erdoğan openly opposed Assad’s brutal crackdown on protesters and began supporting opposition groups.

Turkey became a key supporter of SNF to bolster their fight against Assad. Turkey’s military operations, such as Euphrates Shield, Olive Branch and Peace Spring, were aimed at establishing a buffer zone along its southern border. These operations targeted ISIS and Kurdish terrorist organizations. They also indirectly benefited factions such as HTS, which capitalized on the chaos to expand their influence in northern Syria.

In the post-Assad era, Turkey’s ambition to expand its regional influence is evident in its efforts to position itself as a key power broker in Syria. Alongside Israel to shape the postwar order, Turkey has established de facto Turkish-administered zones in northern Syria, complete with Turkish schools, hospitals, and currency.

As a NATO member, Turkey’s active role in Syria enhances the alliance’s presence in the Middle East as it counters Russian and Iranian influence. Ankara’s strategic location and military capabilities make it a pivotal regional player. Turkey aligns its interests with those of NATO while pursuing its national objectives.

Neutralizing Kurdish threats and managing the refugee crisis are central to Ankara’s agenda. Turkey has committed to continued operations aimed at dismantling Kurdish terrorist organizations to ensure that they do not exploit the post-Assad vacuum to establish a foothold near its borders. 

[Liam Roman edited this piece.]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.